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Abstract. Alvarez and Jermann (2000) show that the constrained eﬃcient
allocations of endowment economies with complete markets and limited commitment
can be decentralized with endogenous borrowing limits on the Arrow securities. In a
model with capital accumulation, aggregate risk and competitive intermediaries, we show
that such a decentralization is not possible unless one imposes an upper limit on the
intermediaries’ capital holdings. Since there is no empirical evidence of such restrictions,
we also characterize the equilibrium with no capital accumulation constraints. We show
that this allocation solves a similar system of equations to the one of the constrained
optimal solution, a result which considerably simpliﬁes the equilibrium computation. In
addition, capital accumulation is higher in this case, since the intermediaries do not
internalize that fact that a higher aggregate capital increases the incentives to default.
Finally, this also implies that agents may enjoy a higher welfare in the long run in spite
of the fact that this allocation is not constrained eﬃcient.
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11. Introduction
During the recent years, models with limited commitment have been used to analyze sev-
eral important economic issues. Among others, Thomas and Worrall (1988) study eﬃcient
wage contracts, Kocherlakota (1996) analyzes optimal risk sharing and Alvarez and Jermann
(2001) study asset returns. Whereas the previous literature mostly focuses on closed econ-
omy endowment models, several authors, such as Krueger and Perri (2005), Wright (2005)
and Bai and Zhang (2005), have recently incorporated capital accumulation into such a con-
text to study inequality and open economy issues. On the other hand, limited commitment
economies with both capital accumulation and aggregate uncertainty have received less atten-
tion. One exception is the work by Kehoe and Perri (2002a), where the authors use an open
economy model with production to analyze stylized facts in international macroeconomics.
In the present paper, we study the consequences of introducing endogenous production
and aggregate uncertainty into a closed economy framework that is similar to the one studied
by some of the previous authors. In particular, we focus on the relationship between con-
strained eﬃcient allocations and competitive equilibria with endogenous borrowing limits,
providing versions of the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics for economies with
production and limited enforcement. In our environment, limited commitment arises because
agents have the option to default on their ﬁnancial liabilities every period. In particular, we
assume that all their assets are seized in the default period, after which they are excluded
from future asset trade (risk sharing) permanently. This implies that they have to solely rely
on their labour income, which depends on the aggregate state of the economy (capital stock
and aggregate productivity). Given this, their outside option (autarky value) also depends
on the aggregate states.
As shown by Alvarez and Jermann (2000), the constrained eﬃcient allocations of exchange
economy models with complete markets and limited commitment can be decentralized as a
competitive equilibrium with debt constraints on the Arrow securities that are not too tight.
These are the loosest possible borrowing limits that do not allow for equilibrium default. We
ﬁrst show that this decentralization is not possible if one introduces capital accumulation and
aggregate uncertainty into such a framework. The reason is that, in the presence of binding
enforcement constraints, a higher capital accumulation has two additional eﬀects on the Euler
condition that determines aggregate investment. On the one hand, it increases consumption
and output next period, decreasing the incentives to default and raising therefore the beneﬁts
of a higher aggregate capital. On the other hand, a higher capital tightens the enforcement
constraints through an increase in the outside option or autarky value, reducing the beneﬁts
of more capital. Since the previous two eﬀects drive a wedge between the marginal rates
of substitution and transformation, the optimal allocations cannot be decentralized as a
competitive equilibrium, even in the presence of endogenous debt constraints.
This result has also been shown by Kehoe and Perri (2002b and 2004) for an open
2economy model where the agents are interpreted as countries and have separate production
technologies. Further, the authors show that the constrained eﬃcient allocations in their
setup can be decentralized with either debt constraints on the Arrow securities and capital
accumulation constraints or with government default on foreign loans and capital income
taxes. In the present paper, we focus on a decentralization with borrowing constraints,
since our agents cannot be interpreted as countries and sovereign default would therefore
make no sense. On the other hand, one of our key extensions is the introduction of a
competitive ﬁnancial intermediation sector that operates the investment technology and sets
the endogenous trading limits. In contrast to the ﬁndings of the previous authors, we show
that a decentralization of the constrained eﬃcient allocations in such a setting is not possible
only due to the second eﬀect of capital on the autarky value described above. Moreover,
we show that the optimal allocations can be decentralized with endogenous debt constraints
and with capital accumulation constraints on the capital holdings of the intermediaries.
Note that there is virtually no empirical evidence of the presence of capital accumula-
tion constraints, and it is also diﬃcult to provide equilibrium micro-foundations for these
type of restrictions. Given this, we also characterize the equilibrium allocations with en-
dogenous borrowing constraints on the Arrow security holdings but no capital accumulation
constraints. In particular, we show that these allocations solve almost the same system of
equations as the constrained eﬃcient allocations, with the key diﬀerence that the autarky
eﬀects of aggregate capital accumulation are not internalized by the intermediaries. In ad-
dition, we provide micro-foundations for the endogenous borrowing constraints on Arrow
securities by showing that they would arise as an equilibrium outcome if chosen by the inter-
mediation sector. These characterization results provide a relatively simple solution method
f o rap o t e n t i a l l yv e r yc o m p l i c ated equilibrium problem.
We also compare the competitive equilibria (with and without capital accumulation con-
straints) quantitatively. We ﬁnd that the equilibrium allocations are qualitatively similar in
both cases. In particular, they exhibit perfect risk sharing in the long run with our bench-
mark calibration. However, important diﬀerences arise in the short run. First, the economy
with no capital accumulation constraints accumulates more capital because the constraints
bind occasionally. Second, since a higher capital accumulation increases the autarky value
and the incentives to default, the model with capital accumulation constraints leads to a big-
ger range of initial wealth distributions where the participation constraints are not binding
in equilibrium. Finally, although agents can enjoy a higher consumption in the constrained
optimal allocation, the fact that capital accumulation is lower aﬀects their lifetime utilities
negatively. We ﬁnd that this last eﬀect dominates for the more wealthy agents, since a
higher consumption is less important for them. Given this, the allocation of the economy
without capital accumulation constraints is not Pareto dominated by the constrained eﬃcient
allocation, where these constraints are imposed in equilibrium.
3Finally, we study the sensitivity of these results to alternative model formulations. First,
we modify the autarky penalties by allowing agents to save in physical capital after default.
We ﬁnd that this modiﬁcation does not alter any of the qualitative ﬁndings described above,
although less risk sharing is obviously supported in this case. Second, we choose a diﬀer-
ent calibration where agents are more impatient and where the weight of capital income in
their total income is lower. Under this scenario, the long run equilibrium allocations are
not characterized by perfect risk sharing any more. In this case, the short run diﬀerences
that we described above also hold in the long run. This implies that capital accumulation
in the stationary distribution tends to be higher in the economy without capital accumula-
tion constraints. More surprisingly, we ﬁnd that the economy without capital accumulation
constraints is actually experiencing a higher expected (average) welfare in the stationary
distribution due to the higher aggregate capital.
Our results contribute to an increasingly growing literature studying models with limited
commitment and capital accumulation. In particular, it provides a tractable framework that
can be used to directly study the competitive equilibria in such a context, both along the
transition and in the stationary distribution, without having to impose capital accumulation
constraints. As we have seen, the general equilibrium capital accumulation eﬀects that we
have identiﬁed may play an important role when these models are applied to study important
issues such as inequality or the welfare impact of government policies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model economy. Section 3
discusses the competitive equilibrium with endogenous borrowing limits and ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries that may be subject to capital accumulation constraints. Section 4 characterizes
the constrained eﬃcient allocations of the benchmark economy and shows that a decentral-
ization as a competitive equilibrium with endogenous borrowing limits is only possible in
the presence of accumulation constraints on the capital holdings of the intermediaries. The
competitive equilibrium with no such constraints is characterized in Section 5, where we also
provide micro foundations for the endogenous borrowing limits on Arrow securities. Finally,
Section 6 compares the two competitive equilibria quantitatively and Section 7 summarizes
and concludes.
2. The Economy
We consider an inﬁnite horizon economy with aggregate uncertainty, endogenous production,
idiosyncratic risk and participation constraints.1 Time is discrete and indexed by t =0 ,1,2....
Further, the resolution of uncertainty is represented by an information structure or event-
tree N.E a c h n o d e st ∈ N, summarizing the history until date t,h a saﬁnite number of
immediate successors, denoted by st+1|st. We use the notation sr|st with r ≥ t to indicate
that node sr belongs to the sub-tree with root st. Further, with the exception of the unique
1Our model economy extends the models in Kocherlakota (1996) and Alvarez and Jermann (2000) to a
context with endogenous production.
4root node s0 at t =0 , each node has a unique predecessor, denoted by st−1. The probability
of st as of period 0 is denoted by π(st),w i t hπ(s0)=1 . Moreover, we denote by π(sr|st) the






represent the entire state-contingent sequence for any variable x throughout the paper.
At each node st, there exists a spot market for a single consumption good y(st) ∈ R+,
produced with the following aggregate technology:
y(st)=f(z(st),K(st−1),L(st)). (1)
In the previous equation, K(st−1) ∈ R+ and L(st) ∈ R+ denote the aggregate capital and
labor respectively, with K
¡
s−1¢
∈ R++ given. Further, z(st) ∈ R++ is a productivity shock
that follows a stationary Markov chain with Nz possible values. Given z, the production
function f(z,·,·):R2
+ → R+ is assumed to be continuously diﬀerentiable on the interior of its
domain, strictly increasing, strictly concave in K, and homogeneous of degree one in the two
arguments. Capital depreciates at a constant rate δ. We also assume that fLK(z,K,L) > 0,
limK→0 fK(z,K,L)=∞ and limk→∞ fK(z,K,L)=0for all K>0 and L>0.
The economy is populated by two types of households that are indexed by i ∈ {1,2} ≡ I,
with a continuum of identical consumers within each type.2 Households have additively




















where β ∈ (0,1) is the subjective discount factor and E0 denotes the expectation condi-
tional on information at date t =0 . The period utility function u is strictly increasing,
strictly concave, unbounded below and continuously diﬀerentiable, with limc→0 u0(c)=∞
and limc→∞ u0(c)=0 .
At each date-state st, households receive a stochastic labour endowment  i(st),f o l l o w i n g
a stationary Markov chain with N  possible values. Households supply labor inelastically,
implying that L(st)=
P









βr−tπ (sr)u(ci (sr)) ≥ Vi(st) for i ∈ I.( 3 )






+( 1− δ)K(st−1). (4)
2All the results in the paper hold for any arbitrary ﬁnite number of types, and the assumption of two
types is therefore without loss of generality. On the other hand, it simpliﬁes both the notation and the
computations.
53. Competitive Equilibrium
This section deﬁnes a competitive equilibrium with endogenous borrowing limits and a com-
petitive intermediation sector for the framework described in section 2. To do this, we
assume that the economy is populated by a representative ﬁrm that operates the production
technology and by a risk neutral and competitive ﬁnancial intermediation sector that oper-
ates the investment technology. Since we want to focus on symmetric equilibria where all
intermediaries hold the same portfolio, we focus on the representative intermediary.
Each period, after observing the realization of the productivity shock, the representative








Proﬁt maximization implies that factor prices are given by the following expressions:
w(st)=fL(st) ≡ fL(z(st),K(st−1),L(st)) (5)
r(st)=fK(st) ≡ fK(z(st),K(st−1),L(st)). (6)
The representative intermediary lives for two periods. An intermediary born at node st







. This constraint will play a central role when we decentralize the
constrained eﬃcient allocations. The capital is rented to the ﬁrm, earning a rental revenue
of r(st+1)k(st) and a liquidation value of (1 − δ)k(st) the following period. Further, to
ﬁnance the capital purchases, the intermediary sells the future consumption goods in the



























q(st+1|st)[r(st+1)+( 1− δ)] − ψ(st). (8)
Here, it is important to note that 1 ≤
P
st+1|st q(st+1|st)[r(st+1)+( 1− δ)] due to the
fact that ψ(st) ≥ 0. In other words, if the savings constraint is not binding (ψ(st)=0 ),








q(st+1|st)[r(st+1)+( 1− δ)]k(st) − k(st)=ψ(st)k(st). (9)
6We assume that proﬁts are distributed to the households when they are realized, i.e.
during the ﬁrst period of the intermediary’s life-cycle. The period before an intermediary




shares of it, which they can immediately trade
at a price p
¡
st¢
. Note that this price represents the value of an intermediary that will pay
dividends next period. At each st, households can also trade in a complete set of state
contingent claims to one period ahead consumption. The budget constraint of household




























individual consumption net of the value of initial shares in the intermediaries and of the
individual labor income. In addition, ai(st+1) and θi
¡
st¢
represent the amount of state
contingent claims and shares in the intermediary held by i ∈ I at the end of period t.
Market clearing for the state contingent securities requires that the debt issued by the































+ ai(st) the total asset wealth of the household at the






























As reﬂected by the equation (12), the individual asset wealth is subject to a borrowing
constraint of Ai(st+1). The equilibrium determination of these limits will be discussed below
and in Section 6. If γi(st+1) ≥ 0 is the multiplier on this constraint, the necessary and
suﬃcient ﬁrst order conditions with respect to ai(st+1) and θi(st) from the maximization





































7The previous equation can also be obtained using no arbitrage arguments. Further, it




instead of ai(st+1) and θi(st) separately. We will use this below in our
deﬁnition of a competitive equilibrium. This result also implies that there are a continuum
of possible combinations of ai(st+1) and θi(st) that will yield the same allocations, since the
share in the intermediaries is a “redundant” asset in spite of markets being endogenously








[ωi(st) − Ai(st)] ≤ 0. (15)
Deﬁnition 1. A competitive equilibrium with borrowing constraints {Ai}i∈I , capital









and prices {w,r,q} such that (i) given prices, {ci,ωi} solves
the problem for each household i ∈ I; (ii) the factor prices {w,r} satisfy the optimality
conditions of the ﬁrm; (iii) q, r and d satisfy the optimality condition of the intermediary;














As stated in Section 2, each household has an outside option of Vi
¡
st¢
. In the present
setting, we assume that households can leave the risk sharing arrangement at any date-state
to go to ﬁnancial autarky. In this case, they will only be able to consume their labour income,
while they are excluded from ﬁnancial markets forever.3 Given this, we choose limits that are
not too tight, in the sense that a looser limit would imply that an agent with that level of debt












and write the value of the trading arrangement
recursively as follows:









Deﬁnition 2. The borrowing constraints {Ai}i∈I are not too tight if they satisfy the
following condition for all i ∈ I and all nodes st ∈ N:
Wce(Ai(st),S i(st)) = V ce(Si(st)) (17)










3In Section 7, we also consider the case where households are excluded from trade in Arrow securities but
can still save by accumulating physical capital.
8Note that, in the present setting, the value of staying in the trading arrangement Wce is
strictly increasing in wealth, whereas the autarky value V ce is not a function of ωi(st).T h i s
implies that the limits deﬁned by (17) exist and they are unique under our assumptions on
the utility function. In addition, since Wce(0,S i(st)) ≥ V ce(Si(st)) and Wce is increasing in
ωi, equation (17) implies that Ai(st) ≤ 0. Intuitively, no agent would default with a positive
level of wealth, since he could then aﬀord a higher current consumption than in autarky and
at least as high of a life-time utility as in autarky from next period on.
Before discussing the determination of the constraint eﬃcient allocations, it impor-
tant to note that all our results can be applied to an alternative setting where the in-
termediaries are inﬁnitely lived. In this case, the intermediary decides how much capi-
tal k(st) to purchase at each node subject to the capital accumulation constraint in (7).
Further, the capital is rented to the ﬁrm and it is ﬁnanced by selling the next period
consumption goods in the spot market for one period ahead contingent claims. If we let
Q(st+j|st)=q(st+j|st+j−1)q(st+j−1|st+j−1)...q(st+1|st) be the state st price of consumption

















It is easy to see that equations (8) and (9) still hold in the present setting. Further, we
can assume that proﬁts are distributed to the households every period according to their
beginning of period ownership shares θi
¡
st−1¢
,w h e r eθi
¡
s−1¢


















, the price of the





































, note that it might lead to the typical shareholder disagreement problem under
incomplete markets.4 In other words, when the trading constraints are binding, diﬀerent
household types will typically value future output diﬀerently, since their marginal rates of
substitution are not equalized. Note that this is not an issue if the intermediary lives for
two periods, in which case, a household who holds the majority of shares at st will agree on
using q(st+1|st) as a discount factor. On the other hand, a currently unconstrained agent
4For a good review of this literature see Grossman and Stiglitz (1977, 1980) or Dreze(1985). For a more
formal discussion of this issue in a model where markets are exogenously incomplete see Carceles-Poveda
(2005) and Coen-Pirani (2005).
9may prefer a diﬀerent discount rate if the intermediary is inﬁnitely lived, since she may get
constrained in some future contingency. Given this, we chose to work with the two period
formulation. Both settings lead to the same qualitative and quantitative ﬁndings and this is
therefore without loss of generality.
4. Constrained Efficient Allocations
This section characterizes the constrained eﬃcient allocations of the economy in Section
2. As usual, the optimal allocations solve a central planning problem where the planner
takes into account both the resource constraint and the participation constraints of the two
households. If αi is the initial Pareto weight assigned by the planner to each household, the






















βr−tπ(sr)u(ci(sr)) ≥ V (Si
¡
st¢
) for i ∈ I. (20)






) by assuming that the outside option value











. Whereas standard dynamic
programming is inapplicable to the previous setup, we can follow Marcet and Marimon (1999)



















where βtγi(st) is the Lagrange multiplier of the time t participation constraint for household
i ∈ I.F u r t h e r ,μi(st) is a pseudo state variable that is deﬁned recursively as follows:
μi(st)=μi(st−1)+γi(st), μi(s−1)=0for i =1 ,2. (21)
It is easy to see that the solution to the previous problem can be characterized by the re-









5The above ﬁrst-order conditions for this problem are only necessary but not suﬃcient in general. The
reason is that the constraint set deﬁned by (19) and (20) is not necessarily convex. However, this does not
seem to cause any problem in our model. In particular, when we impose the appropriate Kuhn-Tucker

























































on the right hand side of the previous equation represent the derivatives of total output F
and of the outside option value V with respect to the aggregate capital stock K. Further,
we have expressed the ﬁrst order conditions in terms of the normalized multipliers λ and vi,












Several remarks are worth noting. First, since μi(st−1)+αi > 0, it follows that vi(st) > 0
only if γi(st) > 0.T h i si m p l i e st h a tvi(st) is positive only when the participation constraint
of type i ∈ I is binding. Second, λrepresents a the time varying relative Pareto weight of
type 2 households relative to type 1 households. Thus, as usual in models with endogenously
incomplete markets, condition (22) implies that the relative consumptions of the two types
are determined by their time varying relative Pareto weights. Third, as in other models
with commitment (see e.g. Thomas and Worrall (1988) and Kocherlakota (1996)) whenever
households of type 1 have a binding participation constraint (v1(st) > 0), λ will decrease,
and their relative Pareto weight will therefore increase. The opposite happens when the par-
ticipation constraint of type 2 household is binding. Finally, since the aggregate technology
and the idiosyncratic income shocks are Markovian, the optimal allocation of this problem
is recursive in ( 1,  2,z,K,λ).
As reﬂected by the Euler equation in (23), when the participation constraints are not
binding for any household at any continuation history st+1|st,i m p l y i n gt h a tvi(st+1)=0
for i =1 ,2, the equation reduces to the standard capital Euler condition of the stochastic
growth model. On the other hand, the presence of binding enforcement constraints at st+1
introduces two additional eﬀects on the inter-temporal allocation of consumption and capital.
First, it increases the planner’s marginal rate of substitution between period t and t +
1 goods, raising the beneﬁts of a higher aggregate capital at t +1 , since this increases




on the ﬁrst part of the right hand side of the equation. Second, it tightens the
enforcement constraints through an increase in the autarky value, reducing the beneﬁts of
more capital at t+1.T h i si sr e ﬂected by the autarky eﬀects on the second part of the right
hand side of the equation.



















Essentially, this states that unconstrained agents have the maximal marginal rate of
substitution in the constrained eﬃc i e n te q u i l i b r i u m .N o t et h a tt h i sc a nb ee a s i l yc h e c k e di f

































In what follows, we consider allocations that have high implied interest rates, in the
sense that they have a ﬁnite present value when discounted with the appropriate present
value prices.6



















5. Decentralization with Capital Accumulation Constraints
This section shows that a decentralization of the constrained eﬃcient allocations with debt
constraints is only possible if one imposes the savings constraint on the capital holdings of the
intermediary. In a related model, Kehoe and Perri (2002b, 2004) show that a decentralization
is possible if one introduces either debt constraints and a savings constraint on the individual
capital holdings or government default on foreign loans together with capital income taxes.
In the present framework, however, it is diﬃcult to imagine that governments would default
on behalf of some of the households against some other households in the same economy.
Given this, we focus on a decentralization with borrowing constraints.7
6This assumption is not very restrictive in the present setting, since it will be satisﬁed whenever consump-
tion is bounded away from zero.
7An alternative decentralization based upon our intermediation structure with borrowing constraints and
capital income taxes is analyzed by Chien and Lee (2005).
12We start by showing that constrained eﬃcient allocations with an outside option of
ﬁnancial autarky cannot be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium in the presence of
binding capital accumulation constraints.
Proposition 1. Let {c1,c 2,K} be a constrained eﬃc i e n ta l l o c a t i o n .T h e n ,i tc a n n o tb e
decentralized as a competitive equilibrium with only borrowing constraints that are not too
tight unless the participation constraints in the constrained eﬃcient allocation never bind.
Proof of Proposition 1. To prove the proposition, we can use equation (26) to rewrite




























Consider now the case where there are no capital accumulation constraints. In this case,




















Since the portfolio constraint in (31) can only be binding for one of the two households,
it follows that γi(st+1)=0for at least one household. Given this, equations (13) and (8) of

























where we have substituted for r
¡
st+1¢
from (6). Clearly, the two Euler equilibrium conditions
in (29) and (33) cannot be satisﬁe db yt h es a m ea l l o c a t i o n{c1,c 2,K} if the participation
constraint is ever binding, that is, if vj(st+1) > 0 for some j ∈ I and some st+1|st with
π(st+1|st) > 0. Given this, the constrained eﬃcient allocations cannot be decentralized as a
competitive equilibrium with borrowing constraints that are not too tight.¥
Several remarks are worth noting. First, this result is in contrast to the one obtained by
Alvarez and Jermann (2000), who show that a decentralization of the constrained eﬃcient
allocations with borrowing constraints that are not too tight is possible in the absence of cap-
ital accumulation. Second, a similar result has also been shown by Kehoe and Perri (2002b,
132004), who study an economy with no ﬁnancial intermediaries and with two production sec-
tors that can be interpreted as countries. In their environment, however, a decentralization is
not possible due to the two diﬀerent eﬀects on the standard Euler equation discussed earlier.
In contrast to this, Proposition 1 illustrates that the optimal allocations in our set-up and
i nt h ep r e s e n c eo fﬁnancial intermediaries cannot be decentralized solely due to the autarky
eﬀects, an observation that will prove to be useful in the next section.
To better illustrate the previous statement, consider a setting with no ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries and with two production sectors, as in Kehoe and Perri. In such a framework,




































for i ∈ I.
Comparing the previous equation to the Euler equation of the planner in (23), it is easy
to see that both cannot be satisﬁed by the same allocation, even if VK(Si
¡
st¢
) ≡ 0 for all st+1
and j =1 ,2.T h ek e y d i ﬀerence is that, in the presence of intermediaries, the equilibrium
prices of the Arrow securities given by (32) already take into account one of the eﬀects of
capital accumulation on the value of the risk-sharing arrangement.
To solve this problem, Kehoe and Perri (2002b) suggest to impose a savings constraint
on the individual capital holdings {ki}i∈I that takes care of the two eﬀects on the capital
Euler equation. In what follows, we show that a similar result can also be obtained in our
setup. In particular, we show that the constrained eﬃcient allocations can be decentralized
with borrowing constraints on the Arrow securities that are not too tight if one also imposes
a savings constraint on the capital holdings of the intermediary. This is stated by the
following proposition, which is the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics for our
environment. The proof of this and of all the remaining propositions throughout the text
are relegated to Appendix 1.





i ci(st) has high implied interest rates. Further, assume that the intermediary in the de-
centralized economy is subject to capital accumulation constraints of the form k(st) ≤ B(st).
Then, the constrained eﬃcient allocations can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium
with borrowing constraints that are not too tight.
8Note that the restriction on capital holdings will not be binding in equilibrium.
14The proof of this proposition extends the ones in Alvarez and Jermann (2000) and Kehoe
and Perri (2002b) to the presence of production and ﬁnancial intermediaries that are subject
to capital accumulation constraints.
First, we show that {B} can be set so that a constrained eﬃcient allocation that satisﬁes
the planner’s capital Euler equation also satisﬁes the optimality condition of the intermediary
in the competitive equilibrium. Second, the allocations of the planner’s problem can be used
to construct the dividends d and share prices p, as well as the factor prices (r,w) and the
Arrow security prices q that satisfy the optimality conditions of the ﬁrms and the households.
Further, we can iterate on the budget constraints in the competitive equilibrium to obtain
the wealth levels {ωi}i∈I that support the optimal allocations at every node. It is then
easy to see that the constructed allocations clear the markets and satisfy the transversality
condition. In addition, we ﬁrst set the borrowing limits {Ai}i∈I equal to {ωi}i∈I whenever the
participation constraints in the planner’s problem are binding and to the natural borrowing
limit otherwise.
Finally, we can construct the value functions in the competitive equilibrium from the
value functions of the planner’s problem and redeﬁne the borrowing limits so that they are
not too tight for the cases where the participation constraint in the planner’s problem is not
binding. This way, the constructed allocations with the new borrowing limits are still be
feasible and optimal.
6. Characterization of the CE without Capital Accumulation Constraints
The previous section has shown that a decentralization of the constrained eﬃcient alloca-
tions with borrowing constraints that are not too tight is possible in the presence of ﬁnancial
intermediaries that are subject to accumulation constraints on their capital holdings. How-
ever, there is no evidence for these type of constraints in the data. In addition, it is diﬃcult
to imagine how these upper bounds would arise as an equilibrium outcome. Given this,
the present section characterizes the equilibrium allocations with borrowing constraints that
are not too tight and with no binding capital accumulation constraints. In particular, we
show that these allocations satisfy the same system of equations as the constrained eﬃcient

















The previous result is stated by Propositions 4 and 5. In addition, Proposition 3 below
shows that, if we allow the intermediaries to set the borrowing constraints on the households,
they will choose the ones which are not too tight, providing a micro foundation for our
endogenous borrowing limits.
Proposition 3. (i) The CE with borrowing constraints that are not too tight remains
a competitive (Nash) equilibrium if the intermediaries are allowed set the borrowing limits.
15(ii) No symmetric competitive (Nash) equilibrium exists for limits that are looser than the
ones that are no too tight.
The previous proposition shows ﬁrst that no intermediary has incentives to loosen or
tighten the limits individually when they are not too tight, since these deviations are not
proﬁtable. This implies that these constraints arise as an equilibrium decision of the interme-
diaries. Intuitively, since the intermediaries make zero proﬁts with any limits which do not
allow for default, they have no incentive to tighten them. On the other hand, since they are
price-takers, they cannot break even with looser limits. Further, the proposition also shows
that no symmetric equilibrium exists where some or all of the limits are looser than the ones
dictated by (17). This result is due to the fact that, if there is default, the intermediaries can
always increase their proﬁts by not buying Arrow securities from households with a positive
probability of default next period. We are now ready to state our equivalence results.
Proposition 4. Let {c1,c 2,K} be a solution to equations (19), (20), (22), (24), (25)
and (34) where {c} =
P
i {ci} has high implied interest rates. Then, this allocation can be





be a competitive equilibrium with borrowing




is a solution to equations (19),
(20), (22), (24), (25) and (34). Further, c =
P
i ci satisﬁes the high implied interest rates
condition with respect to the price Q(st|s0) deﬁned by:
Q(st|s0)=q(st|st−1)q(st−1|st−2)...q(s1|s0).
Several remarks are worth noting. First, whereas the competitive equilibrium without
capital accumulation constraints solves a system of equations that is very similar to the opti-
mal planner’s problem, considerably simplifying the equilibrium computations, the solution
is diﬀe r e n tt ot h eo p t i m a la l l o c a t i o nd u et ot h ef a c tt h a ti ti g n o r e st h ea u t a r k ye ﬀects. In
other words, the ﬁnancial intermediaries do not internalize the eﬀect of capital accumulation
on the agents’ autarky valuations, whereas the planner internalizes this eﬀect in the (con-
strained) optimal allocation. The qualitative and quantitative diﬀerences between the two
allocations are studied in section 7 below.
Second, it is important to note that λ(st) measures the relative wealth of the two types of
households in the competitive equilibrium. To see this, we can deﬁne the Lagrange multipliers









where the second inequality is a consequence of Propositions 4 and 5. Since ξi(st) measures
the marginal utility of wealth, a bigger ai(st) corresponds to a smaller is ξi(st).C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
ah i g h e rλ(st) implies that agent 1 has a smaller initial wealth compared to type 2 households.
167. Quantitative Comparison of the Competitive Equilibria
This section compares the two competitive equilibrium allocations (with and without cap-
ital accumulation constraints) numerically. The parameters of the economy are calibrated
following the asset pricing and real business cycle literature. The time period is assumed to
be one quarter, and the discount factor and depreciation rate are therefore set to β =0 .99
and δ =0 .025.T h e ﬁrst parameter is chosen to generate an annual average interest rate
of approximately 4% in the stationary distribution, whereas the second replicates the US
average investment to capital ratio during the postwar period.
Concerning the functional forms, we assume that the production function is Cobb-
Douglas, with a constant capital share of α =0 .36. Further, the utility function of the
households is assumed to be u(c)=l o g ( c). Finally, the exogenous shock processes are as-
sumed to be independent. In particular, the aggregate technology shock follows a two state












The aggregate labor supply is constant and we normalize it to 1. As to the idiosyncratic
income process, it is assumed to follow a seven state Markov chain. The values and transition
matrix are obtained by using the Hussey and Tauchen (1991) procedure to discretize the
following process:
 i0 =( 1− ψ )μ  + ψ  i + u, u ∼ N(0,σ2
u).
The shock parameters are set to ψ  =0 .956 and σ2
u =0 .082, corresponding to quarterly
adjusted estimates from annual idiosyncratic earnings data. Further, since a constant aggre-
gate labor supply implies that  −i =1−  i,t h ev a l u e sf o r 1 were chosen to be symmetric
around μ  =0 .5. This implies that the idiosyncratic productivity of the two types follows
the same process and the shocks are perfectly negatively correlated across the two types.
Finally, note that Proposition 4 and 5 provide us with a relatively easy and analogous
computational method for both models. In the competitive equilibrium with capital accu-
mulation constraints (autarky eﬀects), we use equations (19), (20), (22), (24), (25) and (23).
Further, to solve for the competitive equilibrium with no capital accumulation constraints
(no autarky eﬀects), we use the same system of equations but (23) is replaced by (34).
In what follows, we let s1 =[  ,λ;z,K] and s2 =[ 1−  ,1/λ;z,K]. Under our Markovian
assumption on the shocks, the previous set of equations implies that we can describe the
optimal allocations in both models by the consumption functions {ci(si)}i=1,2 , the normal-
ized multipliers on the participations constraints {νi(si)}i=1,2 and the laws of motion for the
relative wealth λ0(s1) and the aggregate capital K0(s1). To solve for these functions, we use
policy functions iterations in both models.
17Our numerical results for this benchmark parametrization are presented in Figures 1 to 6
of Appendix 2. All the optimal policies are conditioned on the low aggregate technology shock
z =0 .99 and on K =3 8 .6, which is the mean of the stationary distribution of capital, but
similar pictures can be obtained for the high technology shock. For expositional convenience,
we have plotted the results for only three levels of the labour endowment, where  1 is the
lowest and  7 is the highest labor endowment. Recall that type 2 households have the highest
labor endowment when type 1 households have the lowest. Note also that both types have
equal endowments when  4 =1−  4 =0 .5.
Figure 1 displays λ0 ≡ λ(st+1) as a function of λ ≡ λ(st) for the three diﬀerent levels
of the idiosyncratic income shocks. The ﬁrst important observation based on this ﬁgure is
that agents enjoy permanent perfect risk sharing in the long run in both models. To see this,
assume ﬁr s tt h a to u ri n i t i a lλ is inside its ergodic set, which is equal to λ ∈ [0.8368,1.195]
and λ ∈ [0.8366,1.1953] for the models without and with the savings constraint respectively.
As we see on the graph, λ0 = λ inside this region, independently of the labor income shocks.
Condition (22) then implies that this can only happen if neither agent’s participation con-
straint is binding. In addition, the ratio of marginal utilities remains constant over time.
The last result, however, is the deﬁning feature of a perfect risk sharing allocation.
Assume now that we start with λ>2.5, implying that type 1 households hold signiﬁ-
cantly lower initial assets, and they are therefore entitled to less consumption than type 2
households. In this case, Figure 1 implies that λ0 depends on the idiosyncratic income of the
agent, and that it will drop to a new level depending on the shock realization. In particular,
the higher the idiosyncratic income, the lower will be the new level of the relative wealth λ0.
This is due to the fact that type 1 agents will then enjoy a higher autarky value and require
therefore a higher compensation for staying in the risk sharing arrangement.
Here, it is important to note that, whenever λ jumps, type 1 agents’ participation con-
straint is binding, and this new level of λ0 pins down the borrowing constraint Ai of the
competitive equilibrium faced by type 1 households in the previous period. This process will
go on until the highest income ( 7) is experienced by the type 1 agents. In this case, λ will
enter the stationary distribution9 (λ =1 .195) and remain constant forever. Thus, agents
will enjoy permanent perfect risk sharing from that period on. In addition, a symmetric
argument implies that whenever λ<0.83, λ will become 0.83and remain constant forever
after ﬁnite number of periods. Finally, whereas agents will obtain full insurance in the long-
run for any initial wealth distribution, note that the economy may experience movements in
consumption and in λ in the short run.
The second important observation is that two economies are qualitatively very similar.
9We use the terms ergodic set and the stationary distribution loosely in this paper. Notice, however that
we deﬁned these sets as the possible values of λ in the long run. In fact, the initial condition λ0 will pin down
a unique long-run value for the relative wealth, that is, for any given initial value, the long run distribution
is degenerate.
18As stated above, the long-run behavior is practically identical, in the sense that there is
perfect risk sharing in the long run. In addition, if λ(s0) ∈ [0.8368,1.195], the long-run
allocations will be identical. This is due to the fact that the borrowing constraints (and
therefore the savings constraint of the intermediary) will never bind in this case. Thus,
the individual consumptions will be determined by λ(s0) and the capital accumulation will
be (unconstrained) eﬃcient. On the other hand, if λ(s0) is outside the above interval,
the long-run allocations will be somewhat diﬀerent due to the fact that the bounds of the
stationary distribution are slightly diﬀerent in the two models. As we see, the model with
savings constraint allows for a slightly wider range of λ (the wealth distribution) where the
participation constraints are not binding. As we will see below, this is the consequence of
the diﬀerent capital accumulation pattern in the two economies.
Figure 2, shows the optimal consumption of type 1 households in the two economies as
a function of λ for diﬀerent levels of the labor endowment. Obviously, as the relative wealth
of type 1 households decreases (λ increases) their consumption decreases. Also, since we
have perfect risk sharing in the stationary distribution, consumption does not depend on
the idiosyncratic labour endowment there. For the same reason, the optimal consumption
allocations are identical across the two models in this range. Outside the stationary distribu-
tion, as expected, consumption is increasing in the labour endowment. We also observe that
the model with autarky eﬀects allows for a higher consumption for every λ and   outside
the stationary distribution. As explained below, this is the consequence of higher capital
accumulation in the economy with capital accumulation constraints.
Figure 3 displays the next period’s aggregate capital K0 as a function of λ and  .A g a i n ,
aggregate capital is independent of both the wealth distribution and the labour endowments
in the stationary distribution, where it is at its eﬃcient level. On the other hand, markets
are eﬀectively incomplete outside the stationary distribution, where we see a higher capital
accumulation. This result is well-documented in models with exogenously incomplete mar-
kets (see e.g. Aiyagari (1994) for a model without aggregate uncertainty and Ábrahám and
Cárceles-Poveda (2005) for a model with a similar set-up but trade in physical capital only).
As reﬂected by the ﬁgure, a similar behavior arises in the present setting. In particular,
capital accumulation is higher when the low idiosyncratic labour endowment coincides with
low wealth (high λ). This is the case for type 1 households on the upper right corner of the
ﬁgure and for type 2 households in the upper left corner.
To see why this happens, we can look at Figure 1 and at the Euler equation of the
constrained eﬃcient problem in (23). It is clear from Figure 1 that, when type 1 households
have a labour endowment of  7 and low λ (high wealth), the participation constraint of type
2 households is going to be binding in many continuation states (vi(st+1) > 0). In turn, this
implies that the return of investment is higher, and more capital will be accumulated.
In the decentralized problem this is equivalent to an increase of most of the Arrow security
19prices q(st+1|st),i m p l y i n gt h a ti n t e r m e d i a r i e sh a v et op a yal o w e rr e t u r nt ot h ea g e n t sa n d
can therefore invest more. This is the only eﬀect in the model without autarky eﬀects. On
the other hand, this over accumulation is mitigated by the autarky eﬀects in the constrained
eﬃcient allocation. In this case, the planner internalizes that a higher capital will increase the
autarky values, leading to a lower capital accumulation than in the economy with no capital
accumulation constraints. In the decentralized optimal solution, this is internalized with a
binding upper limit on capital accumulation, which deters intermediaries from excessively
overinvesting. In this case, households will also have less incentives to default, since the value
of their outside option is lower due to a lower capital accumulation. As a consequence, we
obtain perfect risk sharing for a higher range of the wealth distribution (a higher range of
λ) in the model with capital accumulation constraints.
Using the results stated in Propositions 2, 4 and 5, we have also depicted the individual
consumptions ci and the next period capital stock K0 as a function of the initial Arrow
security holdings a1 and the same levels of idiosyncratic shocks in Figures 4 and 5.10 As
already documented above, Figure 5 illustrates that capital accumulation is always higher in
the economy with no capital accumulation constraints. In particular, capital accumulation
is the highest when the low idiosyncratic shock for the type 1 households  1 is combined with
a low level of initial asset holdings a1, or when the high idiosyncratic shock for the type 1
households  7 is combined with a high level of initial asset holdings a1. In this latter case,
the borrowing constraint will be binding for the type 2 households. We also note that the
diﬀerence between the two economies is signiﬁcant. In terms of the average investment, the
economy without autarky eﬀects invest 15% more than the one with autarky eﬀects when the
lowest wealth coincides with the lowest income. Consequently, consumption will be higher
in the constrained eﬃcient allocation, especially with these combinations of idiosyncratic
income and initial asset holdings. This is reﬂected in ﬁgure 4.
Finally, Figure 6 shows the life-time utilities of the agents for diﬀerent initial wealth levels.
Obviously, welfare is identical across the two economies in the stationary distribution, since
the allocations are identical. Outside the stationary distribution, however, agents gain some
utility in the allocation with no capital accumulation constraints compared to the allocation
with autarky eﬀects if they are relatively wealthy (a1 > 30) ,a n dt h e yl o o s es o m eu t i l i t y
when they are less wealthy (a1 < 10). The reason for the utility loss in the constrained
eﬃcient allocation is that, although agents can enjoy a higher current consumption, there
is also less capital accumulation, aﬀecting their life-time utility negatively. Since the higher
consumption is more important in utility terms for the low wealth agents, this second eﬀect
dominates only for relatively wealthy households.
Overall, we conclude that both economies have very similar allocations in the long run
(stationary distribution), and they exhibit some important diﬀerences in the short run. As







20we have seen, the model without capital accumulation constraints leads to higher short run
capital accumulation and consequently to a lower current consumption. A key question is
how robust these properties are to some key features of our model and calibration. In order
to check this, we have also investigated several variations of the above model and calibration
in what follows.
Relaxing the Autarky Punishment. In the ﬁrst experiment, we allow agents to
accumulate physical capital in autarky, increasing the value of the outside option and limiting
the scope of risk sharing in both economies. Formally, the autarky value at state-date st solves
the following problem:


































represents the individual capital holdings of type i ∈ I households. Note
that the budget constraint in (35) implies that households face (exogenously) incomplete
asset markets after default. Further, the ﬁrst constraint in (36) reﬂects that households can
only save but not borrow (short-sell) physical capital after default. Finally, we assume that




) as given. Since we only consider individual (Nash) deviations and
there is no default in equilibrium, these expectations are indeed rational.
Whereas we obtain a narrower range of λ in the stationary distribution, all the key
qualitative ﬁndings of our original model are robust to this extension. In particular, we
still ﬁnd a perfect risk sharing in the long-run in both economies, while there is higher
capital accumulation and a lower consumption in the short run with no capital accumulation
constraints.11 We can therefore conclude that neither the qualitative diﬀerences between the
two equilibria nor the long-run perfect risk sharing property is a consequence of the tight
autarky penalty that we have assumed in the benchmark model.
Using Diﬀerent Parameterizations. To see if our results are robust to diﬀerent
parameter values, we have also studied a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent parametrization of the bench-
mark model. First, it is clear that a lower individual discount factor will make default more
attractive in this environment. For this reason, we have set β to 0.65. This relatively low
value of the discount factor was used by Alvarez and Jermann (2001), who study asset pricing
implications of limited commitment in an endowment economy. Since this parametrization
is more consistent with an annual model, we have also increased δ to 0.1. Second, it is clear
11More detailed results are available from the authors upon request.
21that our economy is approaching a pure exchange economy as the one studied by Alvarez
and Jermann (2000) as α goes to 0. In addition, the higher α is, the more important capital
income becomes for the determination of the agents’ consumption. In other words, a lower
capital share will make default ceteris paribus more attractive. Given this, we have reduced
α to 0.20.12
Some of the key results resulting from this parametrization are shown on Figures 7 to
9. As shown by Figure 7, the long-run stationary distribution of λis not degenerate with
the new parameterization, implying that the individual shares of aggregate consumption are
ﬂuctuating in the long run. First, this shows that the full risk sharing result obtained with
the benchmark parametrization is due to the speciﬁc parameter values we have chosen be-
fore. On the other hand, our results illustrate that the qualitative diﬀerences between the
equilibria (with and without capital accumulation constraints) remain the same with the new
parameterization. In particular, the competitive equilibrium without capital constraints is
accumulating more capital, whereas the constrained eﬃcient economy (with capital accumu-
lation constraints) does not Pareto dominate the economy without accumulation constraints.
Since this last economy does not exhibit full risk sharing in the long run, we can also study
the diﬀerences between the two equilibria in the stationary distribution.
Figure 8 displays the path for the aggregate capital stock in the stationary distribution
and along some (artiﬁcial) business cycle simulations. On the second panel of the ﬁgure, the
aggregate productivity shock alternates between 10 low and 10 high values. At the same
time, we draw 1000 independent samples of the idiosyncratic process of the agents for the
same time horizon and we average out the results across these independent samples. Both the
time series and the “business cycle” ﬁgures show that the aggregate capital stock is indeed
higher in the economy without capital accumulation constraints. Finally, Figure 9 shows
how the expected welfare of an agent changes during these artiﬁcial business cycles. Note
that, by the law of large numbers, this expected welfare can be interpreted as the aggregate
(social) welfare in the stationary distribution that arises if we assign equal weights to both
types. Strikingly, we see that welfare is higher under the no capital accumulation constraint
equilibrium throughout the business cycle. This result suggests that, on average, the higher
income in this economy due to a higher capital accumulation oﬀsets the welfare loss due to
less risk sharing. Of course, since this allocation is not constrained eﬃcient but satisﬁes the
constraints of the planner’s problem (20) by construction, agents will suﬀer welfare losses
during the transition towards the higher capital accumulation that will more than oﬀset the
long run gains.
The previous welfare result has several important implications. First, it is related to
the results of Davila et al. (2005) who study exogenously incomplete market economies
12This value is actually consistent with the estimates of Lustig (2004), who classiﬁes proprietor’s income
from farms and partnerships as labor income.
22with heterogeneous agents and show that these economies may beneﬁt from a higher capital
accumulation in the long run for similar general equilibrium reasons. Further, this result
indicates that less risk sharing can have non-trivial beneﬁts in production economies due to
precautionary capital accumulation.
8. Conclusions
The present paper has shown that, in contrast to the ﬁndings in exchange economies, the
constrained eﬃcient allocations of a model with limited commitment and capital accumula-
tion cannot be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium with borrowing constraints that are
not too tight. Our ﬁrst key result is that, with the introduction of ﬁnancial intermediaries,
this decentralization becomes possible by imposing an upper limit on the intermediary’s
capital holdings. In addition, we characterize the competitive equilibrium with borrowing
constraints that are not too tight without imposing any capital accumulation constraints.
In particular, we show that this allocation solves a similar system of equations to the one
of the constrained optimal solution, whereas the only ineﬃciency in this economy is coming
from the fact that intermediaries do not internalize the eﬀects of the aggregate capital on
the autarky value of the agents. Moreover, the borrowing limits are micro founded in such
a setting, since the intermediaries have no incentives to loosen or tighten them.
We think that the last set of results are particularly important, since they characterize an
empirically plausible competitive equilibrium which can be used to analyze several applied
questions where capital accumulation and limited commitment are both important. As an
example, one could study consumption and wealth inequality along the growth path, where
capital accumulation could play an important role in determining the incentives to default. In
these cases, the computation of the equilibrium allocation would not require any extra burden
as compared to the computation of the optimal solution due to our main characterization
result.
Finally, we also show that, using a standard calibration, there are small qualitative
diﬀerences between the equilibrium allocations with and without the capital accumulation
constraint, especially in the long run. This is mostly due to the fact that, under standard
macroeconomic calibration, agents are relatively patient, whereas capital income is a rela-
tively important source of income. In this case, autarky is not an attractive enough outside
option, even if agents can save after default.13 We then show that, with a diﬀerent param-
eterization such that default becomes more attractive, we obtain much less risk sharing in
the long run.
13Note that this is in contrast to the results of Kehoe and Perri (2002, 2004), who study an open economy
with complete markets and production, obtaining an imperfect risk sharing allocation in the long run. First,
whereas their idiosyncratic shocks, are interpreted and calibrated as country speciﬁc aggregate productivity
shocks, they are shocks to individual labour productivity in our economy. Second, Bai and Zhang (2005)
calibrate a similar economy diﬀerently and they ﬁnd extensive risk sharing in the long run.
23Our numerical examples also highlight the fact that the equilibrium where no capital
constraints are imposed may deliver a higher welfare than the constrained eﬃcient alloca-
tion to some agents. Further, agents may enjoy a higher expected welfare in the stationary
distribution in this economy. This implies that policies (capital accumulation constraints or
capital taxes) that are designed to eliminate the autarky eﬀects are not necessarily desir-
able for the society, especially if the objective is to maximize welfare of future generations.
Moreover, this eﬀect identiﬁes a non-trivial beneﬁt from less risk sharing (tighter borrowing
constraints) which arises only in production economies. In sum, our paper points out that
a production economy with aggregate uncertainty can give a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent answer
than an exchange economy when models with limited commitment are used to evaluate the
welfare implications of diﬀerent policies.
APPENDIX 1
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .To prove the proposition, we ﬁrst note that the capital accu-
mulation constraint B(st) can be set so that a constrained eﬃcient allocation that satisﬁes
the planner’s capital Euler equation in (29) also satisﬁes the optimality condition of the
intermediary in (8). In particular, when the enforcement constraint in the planner’s problem
does not bind for any household at period t +1 ,i m p l y i n gt h a tvi
¡
st+1¢
=0for i =1 ,2 and
all st+1|st, B(st) is set to an arbitrary large number so that B(st) >K (st), where K(st) is
capital stock in the planner’s problem. In this case, ψ(st)=0 . Further, when the enforce-
ment constraint in the planner’s problem is binding for any of the two households, B(st) is
set to the level of capital that solves the optimal allocation. In this case, equations (29) and



















Whereas vi(st+1) ≥ 0 and u0 ¡
ci(st)
¢
≥ 0,w eh a v et h a tVK(Si
¡
st+1¢
) ≥ 0 for i =1 ,2,
since our assumptions on the production function imply that the marginal product of labor
is increasing in capital. Given this and that vi(st+1) ≥ 0 and u0 ¡
ci(st)
¢
≥ 0, it follows that
ψ(st) ≥ 0.






that satisfy the optimality conditions of the ﬁrm in
the competitive equilibrium can be constructed from the capital allocation of the planner’s
problem using equations (5)-(6). Further, the consumption allocations from the planner’s
problem and equations (27) and (28) can be used to deﬁne the prices q(st+1|st)=qp(st+1|st)
and Q(st+1|st)=Qp(st+1|st). In addition, q(st+1|st) c a nb eu s e dt od e ﬁne the multiplier
γi(st+1) so that the asset Euler condition of the agents in equation (13) is satisﬁed. It is
easy to check that the multiplier will have the desired properties. In particular, if vi =0 ,
24γi(st+1)=0 .F u r t h e r ,i fvi(st+1) > 0, it follows that γi(st+1) > 0. To see this, suppose that

































Since the high implied interest rate condition holds, we can then use the budget constraint
of the households in the competitive equilibrium to construct the wealth levels ωi(st) that
support the constrained eﬃcient consumption allocations at every node. To do this, we ﬁrst
construct the proﬁts d
¡
st¢
from (9), the share price p
¡
st¢










. Further, we iterate on the budget constraint of each














Concerning the trading limits, if vi(st)=0for agent i,w es e tt h el i m i t sa tt h en a t u r a l












and we will redeﬁne the limit for these cases later. In addition, if vi(st) > 0,w es e tAi(st+1)=
ωi(st+1), implying that it will be binding when the participation constraint in the planner’s





































































25The ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that [ωi(st) − Ai(st)] is equal to zero if the









st+n|st Q(st+n|st)ci(st+n). The second follows from the fact
that ci(st) ≤
P
i ci(st). The third inequality follows from the the deﬁnition of Q(st|s0) and
from the fact that Q(st|s0) ≥ βtπ(st)
u0(ci(st))
u0(ci(s0)) by construction. Finally, the last equality
follows form the high implied interest rate condition.



































































































in (14) and (9) and the homogeneity
of degree 1 property of the production function.
It only remains to redeﬁne the borrowing limits so that they are not too tight. To do






βr−tπ(sr)u(fL (sr) i (sr)).
Similarly, we can construct the value function Wce(ωi(st),S i(st)) and use the two func-
tions to redeﬁne the borrowing constraints for the nodes where the limit is not binding.
In particular, we can iterate on the constraint Ai(st) until we ﬁnd the one that satisﬁes
Wce(Ai(st),S i(st)) = V ce(Si(st)). Since the new set of constraints constraint is (weakly)
tighter than before, the new value of ωi − Ai still satisﬁes the transversality condition. Fur-
ther, since, these constraints do not bind for any household for whom the participation
constraint is not binding in the planner’s solution, the allocation derived above with the
original constraints is still feasible and optimal.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . (i) We ﬁrst show that there are no proﬁtable deviations
from the equilibrium allocation with limits that are tighter or looser then the ones deﬁned
26by (17). To see this, ﬁr s tn o t i c et h a tt i g h t e n i n gt h el i mits will not increase the proﬁts of
any intermediary. Further, we now show that no intermediary can make positive proﬁts by
loosening the limits, that is, by setting Ai(st) ≤ Ai(st) < 0 for all st. T od ot h i s ,a s s u m e
(without a loss of generality) that A1(b s) <A 1(b s) for some b s|e s where the borrowing constraint
is binding for type 1 agents at the level of wealth A1(b s). Under the original prices q(st+1|e s),
this implies that type 1 agents would default next period if node b s|e s occurs. Since type 1
households would choose a1(b s) <A i(b s) < 0 and default if b s occurs, it is easy to see that
the intermediary would make negative proﬁts. First deﬁne a1(st+1|e s) as the asset decision
of type 1 households under the new limits and observe that a1(b s) <A i(b s) ≤ 0 under q(b s|e s).








q(st+1|e s)[r(st+1)+( 1− δ)]k(e s)=0 .
The second equality follows from the equilibrium condition of the intermediaries in (8).
(ii) We now show that there does not exist any symmetric equilibrium with limits that
are looser than the limits that are not too tight. To do this, we assume there exists an
equilibrium with prices q and limits {Ai}i=1,2 such that agents of type 1 would default under
some continuation history st+1|st = b s|st if the current history is st = e s. First, notice that





q(st+1|e s)[r(st+1)+( 1− δ)]k(e s)+q(b s|e s)a1(b s)=0 .





q(st+1|e s)[r(st+1)+( 1− δ)]k(e s) > 0.
Thus, in any symmetric equilibrium with default, it must be the case that:
X
st+1|e s
q(st+1|e s)[r(st+1)+( 1− δ)] − 1 > 0.
The previous condition implies that any intermediary could make arbitrarily positive
proﬁts by trading only with agents of type 2 and by demanding arbitrary large amounts
of total deposits (
P
st+1|e s q(st+1|e s)a2(st+1|e s)) from them. However, this contradicts the fact
that the original portfolio was optimal for the intermediaries under q(st+1|st).¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .The proof follows the same arguments as the proof of propo-
sition 2, and we therefore only sketch it in what follows. First, given the consumption
27allocations {ci}i=1,2 from the planner’s problem, we can use (27) and (28) to deﬁne the
prices q(st+1|st)=qp(st+1|st) and Q(st+1|st)=Qp(st+1|st) for all nodes. Further, since
the high implied interest rate condition holds, we can then use the prices and the budget
constraint of the households in (30) to construct the holdings {ai}i=1,2 so that the con-
strained eﬃcient consumption allocations {ci}i=1,2 are feasible at every node. Note that,
in the absence of a capital accumulation constraint, the proﬁts of the intermediary are al-





st+n|st Q(st+n|st)wi(st+n) and we will redeﬁne this limit later. Fur-
ther, if vi(st) > 0,w es e tAi(st+1)=ai(st+1), implying that it will be binding when the
participation constraint in the planner’s problem is binding. To make sure that the suﬃcient
Euler equations are satisﬁed, we can ﬁrst use q(st+1|st) to deﬁne the multiplier γi(st+1) so
that the Euler condition of the agents in (13) is satisﬁed. It is easy to see that an allocation
that satisﬁes (34) also satisﬁes the equilibrium condition of the intermediary in (8) with
ψ =0 . Further, using the same arguments as in the proof of proposition 2, we can check





[ai(st) − Ai(st)] ≤ 0 is satis-
ﬁed. Finally, we can construct the value functions W(ai(st);Si(st)) and V (Si(st)) from the
value functions of the planner’s problem and redeﬁne the borrowing constraints on Arrow
security holdings so that they satisfy W(Ai(st+1);Si(st+1)) = V (Si(st+1)) at every node.
Since these limits do not bind for the originally unconstrained consumers, the constructed
allocations are still feasible and optimal.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . To prove the proposition, we ﬁrst note that the resource
constraint in (19) is satisﬁed by the competitive equilibrium allocations. Since the asset
holdings are subject to portfolio restrictions {Ai}i∈I that are not too tight, the value functions
in the competitive equilibrium satisfy:
Wce(ai(st),S i(st)) ≥ V ce(Si(st))









sr βr−tπ(sr|st)u(w(sr) i(sr)). Given this, the functions deﬁned
by W(Si(st)) = Wce(ai(st),S i(st)) and V (Si(st)) = V ce(Si(st)) satisfy the participation
constraints in (20). We also note that the competitive equilibrium allocations still solve
the same problem if the borrowing constraints on the Arrow securities of the unconstrained










Optimality implies that the previous limit is ﬁnite.14 In addition, since the shocks z
and   lie in a compact set, the present values of K and fL
¡
st¢
are ﬁnite, we can use the
14In an exchange economy context with sequential trade and potentially incomplete ﬁnancial markets,
28resource constraint to show that the competitive equilibrium allocation satisﬁes the high
implied interest rate condition.
To recover the multipliers in the planner’s problem, we can ﬁrst use the equilibrium
consumption allocations to deﬁne λ(st)=
u0(c1(st))
u0(c2(st)) .F u r t h e r ,{vi}i=1,2 can be recovered as
follows. If the portfolio constraint is not binding for household i at node st in the decentral-
ized problem, we set vi(st)=0 . Otherwise, if it is binding for agent two, we set v1(st)=0























Clearly, this implies that equations (22) and (24)-(25) are satisﬁed. In addition, the zero































Given this, the Euler equation of the planner in (34) is also satisﬁed.¥
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31Appendix 2: Figures
Figure 1: Next Period Wealth Distribution (λ
0) as a Function of λ and  


































































































































































35Figure 2: Optimal Consumption (c1) as a Function of λ and  




































36Figure 3: Next Period Capital Stock (K0) as a Function of λ and  






























































37Figure 4: Optimal Consumption (c1) as a Function of a1 and  




























38Figure 5: Next Period Capital Stock (K0) as a Function of a1 and  















































39Figure 6: Life-Time Utility (W1) as a Function of a1 and  
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40Figure 7: Next Period Wealth Distribution (λ
0) as a Function of λ and  

































































41Figure 8: Next Period Capital Stock (K0) from Time Series Simulations
























Aggregate Capital Accumulation in a Long Run Simulation
























Aggregate Capital Accumulation Along the Business Cycle
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42Figure 9: Average Life-Time Utility (W1) from Time Series Simulations
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